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The Commotion of Souls
Lisa Zunshine
First, a couple of emotional dilemmas:
I love bringing my six-year-old to the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
when we are in New York in the summer. On Thursdays, they have a 
special hour for children. A curator first talks with them about an artwork 
and then encourages them to draw pictures inspired by it. My son seems 
to enjoy it. Yet every time I tell him that we are about to go to the MET, 
he says that he doesn’t want to. Don’t you remember, I plead with him, 
that you liked it last time? No, he says, he didn’t. I cajole and bribe, and 
keep hoping that a day will come when he will remember how he felt 
about it last week. 
During a dissertation defense, I ask a question, and, as the candidate 
begins to answer, I realize that she must have misunderstood me. What 
she is saying is interesting, though. Should I just go with it, or should I 
restate my original query in different terms? I wonder, too, if other com-
mittee members think that she misunderstood the question or that she 
did understand it but didn’t know how to answer it and so decided to 
talk about something else.
A thought within a thought. A feeling within a feeling. A feeling 
within a thought within a feeling. I hope that my son will remember next 
week how he feels about the MET this week. I wonder if the other com-
mittee members think that the candidate intentionally chose not to answer 
a difficult question. I am sure that if I ask you to think about your day, 
you, too, may recall an occasion on which you “embedded” (or “nested”) 
thoughts and feelings in this recursive fashion. Or: I am sure you will recall 
an occasion on which you were thinking about other people’s thinking. 
It’s difficult to say how often we do this, that is, how often we embed 
mental states within each other, especially since we don’t usually stop and 
think about it. On the one hand, many complex social situations seem to 
depend on this kind of cognitive construction. On the other hand, our 
days are not always chock-full of complex social situations, which means 
that we end up thinking about people’s thinking about people’s thinking 
relatively infrequently.
Fiction is where it gets interesting. Embedded mental states—a 
thought within a thought within a thought, or a feeling within a thought 
within a feeling—are everywhere in fiction. That is, they are everywhere 
in our experience of reading—as opposed to just being there in the text, 
immanent, intrinsic, unchanged by who opens the book and when. (The 
cognitive approach, as Ralf Schneider reminds us, “points to the utter 
variety of the cognitive and emotional activities triggered in readers who 
encounter beings in fictional worlds.”1) For instance, a reader not attuned 
to Jane Austen’s use of free indirect discourse may accept as a given a 
particular novel’s unflattering view of a character’s feelings, while a dif-
ferent reader may recognize, with delight and amusement, the implied 
author’s intention to foreground another character’s unselfconscious bias 
toward the first character. But while the content of mental states may thus 
differ from one reader to another, what remains constant is the underly-
ing structure: to make sense of what we read, we embed mental states.
How far can we take this claim? For the time being and until proven 
demonstrably wrong, I will take it as far as possible and say that without 
mental states consistently embedded on at least the third level, there is 
no fiction. That is, no novels, no short stories, no drama, no narrative 
poetry, and no memoirs concerned with imagination and consciousness, 
such as Vladimir Nabokov’s Speak, Memory or Maxine Hong Kingston’s 
The Woman Warrior. (Note that this list does not include storybooks for 
children under the age of three.2)
Pick a book from your shelf and read one paragraph. Think of how 
you would tell your friend, who has not read it, about what’s going on 
in this paragraph. There is a good chance that as you do, you’ll find 
yourself explaining to your friend what a particular character wants 
other characters to think or feel. Or what an author wants her readers to 
think or feel: embedded mental states can be associated with characters, 
narrators, implied readers, and implied authors in an infinite variety of 
combinations. Although this is not an absolute rule, it seems that more 
often than not, embedded mental states in fiction start accumulating on 
the level of paragraphs.
They can also structure entire chapters or acts. For instance, Iago 
wants Othello to think that Desdemona is in love with Cassio. Romeo 
doesn’t know that Juliet merely wanted some people to think that she is 
dead. Odysseus wants the Trojans to think that the Greeks left behind the 
wooden horse because they hope to propitiate Athena for the desecration 
of her temple. Tom Sawyer doesn’t want his friends to realize that he hates 
whitewashing the fence. Sei Shonagon wants other courtiers to admire 
her poetic dexterity, but she doesn’t want them to think that she is flaunting 
what they would consider her (unladylike) knowledge of Chinese. Grush-
nitzki doesn’t know that Pechorin knows about his intention to humiliate 
him during their duel, by leaving Pechorin’s gun unloaded.
Sometimes individual sentences contain complex embedments. 
Here’s one from Stephenie Meyer’s The Twilight Saga: “I tried very hard 
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not to be aware of him for the rest of the hour, and, since that was impos-
sible, at least not to let him know that I was aware of him” (74). Here’s 
another, from the Old English poem “The Wanderer,” dated somewhere 
between the late sixth and the early tenth century: 
 Indeed I cannot think
 why my spirit
 does not darken
 when I ponder on the whole
 life of men
 throughout the world, 
 How they suddenly
 left the floor (hall), 
 the proud thanes.
I wonder why I am not depressed when I think about death. In this 
example, and elsewhere, observe how difficult it is to separate “emotion” 
from “thought” when it comes to complex mental states, in poetry or 
one’s personal life. The term “mental state” encompasses both cognition 
and affect.3
I quoted from The Twilight Saga and “The Wanderer” to give you 
examples of explicitly spelled-out mental states. Here is an example in 
which they are not mentioned at all, and the reader has to deduce implied 
thoughts and feelings to make sense of what’s going on. The first sen-
tence of Zadie Smith’s On Beauty, “One may as well begin with Jerome’s 
emails to his father” (3), overflows with recursive intentions. The implied 
author wants her readers to know that the action will be filtered through 
the consciousness of a reflective narrator. 
And there is more, of course. Those familiar with the opening of E. 
M. Forster’s Howards End, “One may as well begin with Helen’s letters to 
her sister” (3), will sense yet another set of intentions in Smith’s first sen-
tence. The author wants her reader to know that the action will be filtered 
through the consciousness of a reflective narrator—and that she meant her 
novel to be a meditation on Forster’s novel. There are no direct references 
to mental states in the sentence about Jerome’s emails to his father, yet 
its impact on the reader is directly bound to its embedded intentionality.
I don’t think we notice it, though. Were I to articulate my feelings 
upon first opening Smith’s novel, I’d say that I experienced a pleasing 
jolt of recognition and something that could be expressed in words as, 
“Oh, so it’s that kind of book!” It is when I try to really slow down and 
figure out what kind of mental work goes into “Oh, so it’s that kind of 
book!” that I end up considering the embedded intentions of the author. 
In this respect, fictional embedments are similar to those in our daily 
life. We are no more aware of nesting thoughts and feelings while reading 
a novel than we are aware of nesting thoughts and feelings while dealing 
with an actual social situation. That is, sometimes we articulate our feel-
ings to ourselves and others, as in, “I was wondering if you thought that 
she didn’t know how to answer that question,” but, quite often, we just 
act on them without bringing them to our conscious awareness. 
So as I sit there, feeling a twinge of worry about the candidate’s per-
formance and wondering if the other committee members are thinking that 
she has decided to sidestep a difficult question, I may be noticing that one 
of them just stopped looking at her iPad and is now facing the candidate 
directly and that another is tapping the desk with her fingers. Without 
being aware of doing so, I see their body language as indicative of their 
conjectures about the candidate’s intentions. I could be wrong—in fact, I 
am almost certainly wrong—but go tell that to my cognitive adaptations 
that evolved to read people’s bodies in terms of their mental states and 
that are, moreover, subject to egocentric bias (i.e., when one’s perspective 
is used as default in figuring other people’s perspectives)! Thus my next 
question to the candidate may be dictated by my intention to show my 
colleagues that they don’t need to assume that she didn’t know how to 
answer the earlier one, even though I’ve never explicitly spelled out to 
myself my concern about their assumptions.
Just so, when reading Michail Lermontov’s A Hero of Our Time, I am 
not perplexed when, in the middle of his duel with Grushnitzki, Pechorin 
asks their seconds to reload his gun. Nor am I bewildered by Pechorin’s 
cruelty, when after giving Grushnitzki another chance to recant (which he 
doesn’t take), Pechorin proceeds to kill him. I may have never explicitly 
articulated to myself the triply-embedded “Grushnitzki doesn’t know that 
Pechorin knows about his intention to humiliate him during their duel, by 
leaving Pechorin’s gun unloaded,” but it is this embedment (or one very 
close to it) that makes my current understanding possible. 
I have more examples to offer, along with a discussion of patterns 
of embedment in fiction, but here is an important question that we must 
consider first. Do metaphors such as “embedding” and “nesting” actu-
ally reflect what’s going on in people’s brains? They are certainly visually 
compelling—bringing to mind an image of concentric circles, or, perhaps, 
of matryoshka dolls fit snugly within each other—yet the view of the brain/
mind that they imply should give us pause. Human social cognition is too 
messy and distributed to be accurately captured by these neatly spatial 
images. It is thus worth inquiring into the work of cognitive scientists to see 
if their research bears out our speculations about “nested” mental states. 
The View from the Cognitive Sciences
1. Cognitive, Evolutionary, and Developmental Psychology
A starting point for talking about embedded mental states in fiction 
is, of course, research in cognitive psychology that deals with “theory of 
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mind,” a.k.a. “mindreading”—that is, our evolved cognitive tendency to 
see observable behavior as caused by unobservable mental states, such as 
thoughts, desires, feelings, and intentions. Mindreading is as fundamental 
a feature of our social life as it is flawed: we can’t help interpreting be-
havior in terms of mental states (e.g., “Is he frowning because he doesn’t 
like what I am saying?”) even though we have had myriad opportunities 
to learn that we are often wrong in our mindreading attributions (e.g., 
the person might be frowning because he just realized that he forgot his 
phone at home). 
Our daily mindreadings (and misreadings) happen mostly below 
the level of conscious awareness. They are endlessly nuanced, fuelled by 
cultural stereotypes, power dynamics, and personal histories. Moreover, 
they are so profoundly context-dependent that any essentialist claim that 
some people are “better” at it than others makes no sense. For instance, 
studies have shown that people in weaker social positions may engage 
in more active and perceptive mindreading than people in stronger so-
cial positions. Interestingly, “when one is given the role of subordinate 
in an experimental situation, one becomes better at assessing the feeling 
of others, and conversely, when the same person is attributed the role of 
leader, one becomes less good.”4
A prime example of essentialist thinking spurred by work on theory 
of mind is the view, still prevalent in some quarters, that autistics “lack” 
mindreading abilities. This view reveals more about neurotypicals’ own 
mind-reading biases—that is, their assumption that theory of mind must 
manifest itself in a particular, familiar, socially sanctioned way—than it 
does about the actual cognition of autistics.5  In other words, precisely 
because we begin to appreciate the explanatory power of the concept 
of theory of mind, we must be cautious about the results of our mind-
readings. The unreflective speed and readiness with which we attribute 
mental states are likely to be consequences of the adaptive function of 
mindreading, but “adaptive” doesn’t translate into “accurate,” and the 
speed masks deep problems inherent in the process.
Given how maddeningly imprecise the terms “theory of mind” 
and “mindreading” are, as well as certain unattractive baggage that they 
have already accumulated, some scholars working with cognitive ap-
proaches to literature are looking for alternatives. For instance, cognitive 
narratologist Alan Palmer prefers to talk about “attribution theory” to 
show “how narrators, characters, and readers attribute states of mind 
such as emotions, dispositions, and reasons for actions to characters, 
and, where appropriate, also to themselves.”6  I admire Palmer’s work 
no matter what he calls the underlying cognitive process, but, for myself, 
I don’t find the baggage troublesome enough to shun the original terms. 
Instead, when I disagree with some of the cognitive scientists’ claims 
about theory of mind, I say so in print and move on.7  “Theory of mind” 
and “mindreading,” are far from perfect, but the phenomenon that they 
attempt to describe is so complex that I suspect in the long run that any 
descriptive label will fall short.
Fiction exploits the fact that on some level we don’t attend too closely 
to the difference between mental states of real and imaginary people: we 
interpret and misinterpret the behavior of fictional characters using the 
same cognitive adaptations for mindreading that we do when we interpret 
and misinterpret the behavior of people around us. Fiction builds on and 
experiments with our keen interest in social minds: in novels that we read 
and plays that we watch, mindreading patterns present in our everyday 
interactions are intensified and enhanced.8
(From here on, the discussion of the view from the cognitive sci-
ences will become somewhat technical. Readers not interested in details 
are advised to skip this section as well as the next one and go directly to 
the third, “What’s in a Name?”)
When it comes to embedded mental states, we have research of 
evolutionary psychologists, such as Robin Dunbar, who, in their work 
with adult subjects, have explored what they call “levels of intentional-
ity” (which is equivalent to levels of embedment, or nesting), suggesting 
that “fifth-order intentionality,” as in, “I suppose that you believe that I 
want you to think that I intend,” represents “a real upper limit for most 
people,”9  that is, the level after which their understanding of the situa-
tion drops drastically. 
Then there is also research in developmental psychology, which 
focuses on “doubly embedded representations” in children, that is, their 
“awareness not just that people have beliefs (and false beliefs) about the 
world, but that they also have beliefs about the content of others’ minds 
(i.e., about others’ beliefs), and similarly, these too may be different or 
wrong.”10  This ability arguably matures between five and seven years 
of age (in contrast, the ability to appreciate false beliefs matures around 
four years of age,11  or even earlier12), and it is “fundamental to children’s 
. . . understanding of the epistemic concepts of evidence, inference, and 
truth” (Astington et al, 133, 142).
Interestingly, in experiments involving kindergarteners and first-
graders writing letters to hypothetical friends who have never experienced 
some of the things familiar to the authors of letters (such as, for instance, 
snow), the “recursive understanding of embedded mental states” was 
shown to be implicated with children’s growing awareness of a reader’s 
knowledge as distinct from that of the writer. Around seven years of age, 
children realize that “an effective writer represents how their reader will 
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interpret their textual meaning (authorial intention) in the light of that 
reader’s experience” (Peskin et al). Presumably, it is this maturing capac-
ity for knowing that the other person may not know something that you 
know, which enables a broad range of literary experiences, including, but 
not limited to dramatic irony, both in books for young children (repre-
sented, for instance, by a variety of trickster stories) and for older readers.
2. Cognitive Neuroscience
The neuroscience of mindreading is a large, thriving area, but 
because I am interested in embedded mental states, I will focus here 
on research that explores brain regions involved in “thinking about 
thoughts.”13  As one recent review of brain connectivity methods has 
pointed out, “understanding complex social interactions among people 
who are presumed to be social, interactive, and emotive always involves 
the processing of self-reflective thoughts and judgments” (Li et al). For 
instance, handling communicative intentions is “a more complex process 
than simply thinking about intentions, since we have to recognize that 
the communicator is also thinking about our mental state. This involves 
a second-order representation of mental state. We have to represent the 
communicator’s representation of our mental state” (Frith). Brain areas 
involved in this kind of “social understanding of others” are associated 
with the medial prefrontal cortex, its various sub-regions contributing 
differently to this function (Li et al).
One influential early study, Rebecca Saxe’s “People Thinking About 
Thinking People,” has identified a region of the temporo-parietal junction 
“selectively involved in representation of other peoples’ mental states,” 
that is, a region showing “increased response to tasks/stimuli that invite 
theory of mind reasoning (about true or false beliefs) compared with 
logically similar non-social controls” (1836). Since then, other studies 
have addressed questions ranging from whether the same brain region 
supports thinking about people’s “appearance, social background, or per-
sonality traits” (it seems that it doesn’t)14  to what neural populations may 
underwrite the “representations underlying human emotion inference.”15 
Then there is also the puzzling divergence between “recent advances 
in developmental psychology [which] suggest that children have some 
understanding of false beliefs much earlier than age 3 years, and initial 
neuroimaging studies of children’s brains [which] suggest that key matu-
rational changes in the [right temporo-parietal junction] occur much later 
than age 5 years.”16
To account for this divergence, some scientists now propose a two-
systems model of mindreading.17  It would consist of “’low-level’ processes 
that are cognitively efficient but inflexible, and ‘high-level’ processes that 
are highly flexible but cognitively demanding” (Apperly 143). In this view, 
when we “make explicit judgments about what others think or want” (or 
want us to think), we rely on the “high-level” processes, but what “gets us 
through our social day” is a “combination of low-level mindreading pro-
cesses and the rich endowment of social knowledge that we gain through 
development” (Apperly 155). The “two-system” proposal is likely to be 
vigorously debated in the coming years, but then so is everything else 
that we currently know about the attribution of “cognitive and affective 
mental states,” both to real people and to fictional characters. 
3. What’s in a Name?
To sum up, what can we say about the cognitive underpinnings 
of recursively embedded mental states? According to the research from 
cognitive, evolutionary, and developmental psychology, as well as from 
cognitive neuroscience, the phenomenon under consideration matures in 
development, presents enough of a cognitive burden to have something 
resembling an upper limit set to it, and is supported by specific brain 
regions. 
To return to my earlier question, which started the present excursion 
into the cognitive sciences—namely, whether the terms “embedment” 
and “nesting” capture any of the actual structures in the mind/brain—it 
seems that the answer should be no. In fact, the proliferation of terms—
such as recursive embedment, perspective embedment, nesting, level-two 
perspective taking, second-order theory of mind, second-order false-belief 
understanding, levels of intentionality, multiple-order intentionality, 
and so forth—suggests that there is no particular need to put too much 
ontological stock into any of them.
It is worth noting that all these names converge on the image of 
layered, or leveled, structure, with some implication of hierarchical 
relationship among those layers. But that image may reflect the long cul-
tural history of visualization18  as well as cognitive biases that shape our 
thinking, not any inherent properties of the brain’s structure. And so with 
embedment and nesting—my personal terms of choice—one has to re-
member that while the phenomenon that they attempt to describe is likely 
to be real, the descriptions themselves are likely to remain metaphorical.
But let’s say we keep firmly in mind Johanna Drucker’s warning 
that “visualizations are always interpretations” (7) and resist the inter-
pretive potential of the image of layered hierarchical structure. We are 
still faced with another difficult question. To show that works of fiction 
rely on nested mental states for their meaning, I map out those mental 
states, and to do that, I reduce and amplify a sentence, a paragraph, or a 
scene under consideration. How, then, can I claim to observe and report 
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a certain underlying cognitive dynamic of our engagement with fictional 
texts, when my observation is clearly an act of interpretation, and thus 
must impact that dynamic?
I do not have a fully satisfying answer to this question. I can say that 
cognitive literary studies is not the worst nor only offender in this respect; 
that cognitive scientists who research “thinking about thoughts” are sub-
ject to similar pressures; that any attempt to explore a complex system 
with the tools supplied solely by that system will impact the results; that 
cognition itself is interpretation, and that our best hope is to be aware of 
it and regard what seems to be an “objective” observation with a healthy 
dose of skepticism. For, it seems that for cognitive literary analysis (no 
less so than for other, more traditional forms of literary criticism), the 
pleasures of interpretation are also its dangers. 
Case Studies and Close Readings
I now offer you a series of embedments culled from novels spanning 
two thousand years: from ancient Rome and Greece and eleventh-century 
Japan, to eighteenth-century England, nineteenth-century France, and 
twentieth-century U.S. I chose each excerpt to demonstrate a particular 
feature of fictional embedment. Here is the brief rundown of these features:
• We can’t reduce a high-level embedment to a low-level one and 
still get an accurate sense of the meaning of the passage.
• The number of embedded mental states does not have to cor-
respond to the number of characters.
• Although a story may seem to focus on “flesh-and-blood” 
characters, the mental states that we embed to make sense of 
what we read may belong to “disembodied” entities such as its 
narrator, fate, God, the implied author, and the implied readers, 
as well as the characters.
• A work of fiction may be conspicuously presented as not dealing 
with thoughts and feelings. The characters may be shown to lack 
“psychology,” “interiority,” “depth,” etc., or live in a society that 
eschews any discussion of emotional life. This does not change 
the fact that the only way in which readers can make sense of 
what’s going on is by embedding mental states.
• Mappings of embedded mental states aren’t pretty. 
 
As you follow my case studies, you will recognize some of them as 
instances of close reading: a foundational technique of literary analysis 
and teaching. The reason that an inquiry into embedded mental states 
may end up as a close reading is that any close reading is an explication 
of mental states—those of characters, implied readers, and/or implied 
authors.19  We don’t think about it in these terms, but it’s worth consider-
ing. Next time you are developing a close reading, pause and take a closer 
look at all the embedment of mental states you perform along the way.
1. We can’t reduce a high-level embedment to a low-level one and still 
get an accurate sense of the meaning of the passage
In Apuleius’s The Golden Ass (second century A. D.), a young widow 
learns that her beloved husband was treacherously murdered during a 
boar-hunt by the man who had long wanted her himself. Unaware that 
she knows about his perfidy, that man is now pressing the widow for 
marriage. She “pretend[s] to be won over” and suggests that they have a 
clandestine affair, “just until the year travels the full length of its remain-
ing days,” at which point they would wed. She wants him to believe that 
she is eager to sleep with him yet is ashamed that people would think 
it unseemly for a new widow. So he agrees to come to her house late at 
night, muffled “from head to foot and bereft of [his] escort” (167), thus 
leaving himself vulnerable to her gory revenge. 
Note that you can’t reduce third-level embedment to first- or second-
level and still get the full meaning of the situation described by Apuleius. 
“The widow is eager to sleep with the man who killed her husband” is plain 
wrong. “The man thinks that the widow is eager to sleep with him” reflects 
only the limited perspective of the doomed character. “The widow wants 
the man to think that she wants to sleep with him,” or, “The widow wants 
the man to think that she is afraid of what people will say if she becomes 
his mistress so early into her bereavement” begin to get there. 
To follow this revenge plot, readers have to embed mental states 
of its protagonists. But The Golden Ass also contains plenty of situations 
in which, in addition to the mental states of characters, we also have to 
embed mental states of the implied author and the implied reader. For 
instance, when the goddess Venus learns that her son, Cupid, has ignored 
her order to humiliate and destroy Psyche (of whose beauty Venus was 
jealous), and has instead married Psyche, and that they are now expecting 
a baby, she rushes into the bedroom where Cupid lies and begins “roaring 
with all the strength in her”: 
Pretty classy goings-on, huh? A nice way to make your family look 
good! . . . I was in a fight to the finish with a girl, and now I have to put 
up with her as my daughter-in-law? And what’s more, you worthless, 
disgusting hound, you assume that you’re the only one fit to breed, as 
if I’m too old to have a baby. This is just to let you know: I am going to 
have another son, much better than you, and to humiliate you even more 
I’m going to adopt one of the slaves born in my house, sign everything 
over to him: those wings and that torch, and that bow, and your actual 
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arrows—all the tools of my trade, which I didn’t give you to use like 
this. It’s totally up to me, because there was no money set aside from 
your father’s estate to buy you this equipment. (112)
Venus wants Cupid to know that she is extremely angry. What Venus 
doesn’t know, however, is that just now Cupid has abandoned Psyche 
for not trusting him and following the advice of her envious sisters, 
and that Psyche is desperate to win back Cupid’s love. (Were Venus to 
know all this, she might try attacking Psyche while the girl is lonely and 
vulnerable, instead of simply venting her anger at her son.) Those are 
straightforward enough third-level embedments, but they are not what 
make the passage hilarious.
What makes it hilarious is the interplay of mental states of the im-
plied author and the implied reader. As the novel’s recent translator, Sarah 
Ruden, puts it, Apuleius “exquisitely [manages] the tension between the 
high and low, the inside and outside points of view” (xv). The goddess of 
love, beauty, fertility, and prosperity comes across as garrulous, jealous, 
feeling her age, and penny-pinching. Apuleius knows that we don’t expect 
Venus to sound like this, and we know that he knows that we didn’t expect 
this. The comic effect of Venus’ speech stems from this nested awareness. 
When embedment is driven by style (here, parody) as opposed to 
content (see the earlier example from The Twilight Saga), there are often 
several ways to map it out. I just suggested, “we know that Apuleius 
knows that we didn’t expect Venus to sound like this,” but a different 
mapping is also possible. Readers may or may not remember that, within 
the novel, the story of Cupid and Psyche is narrated by an old crone who 
keeps house for pirates and who wants to soothe and entertain a young 
woman kidnapped by those pirates. So if we do remember it, we can say 
that “Apuleius uses the old crone as his framing device because he wants 
a narrator incapable of imagining a Venus who would feel differently from 
herself under these circumstances.” 
Either way, your interpretation and hence mapping may differ 
drastically from mine. But to be plausible and non-reductive—that is, 
to reflect as accurately as possible what you perceive as this passage’s 
meaning—it has to embed mental states on at least the third level. First- 
or second-level embedments simply will not do justice to the complexity 
of Apuleius’s writing.
In Heliodorus’ An Ethiopian Romance (third century A.D.), an Egyp-
tian priest, Calasiris, tells to his acquaintance, Cnemon, the story of the 
first meeting of the protagonists, Chariclea and Theagenes. During a public 
celebration at the altar of Apollo, Theagenes is supposed to receive a torch 
from a priestess (i.e., Chariclea) with which to light the altar piled with 
animal sacrifices. The surrounding crowd includes Chariclea’s adopted 
father, Charicles, who is, however, too busy right now, to observe his 
daughter closely:
At first they stood in silent amazement, and then, very slowly, she 
handed him the torch. He received it, and they fixed each other with 
a rigid gaze, as if they had sometime known one another or had seen 
each other before and were now calling each other to mind. Then 
they gave each other a slight, and furtive smile, marked only by the 
spreading of the eyes. Then, as if ashamed of what they had done, 
they blushed, and again, when the passion, as I think, suffused their 
hearts, they turned pale. In a single moment . . . their countenances 
betrayed a thousand shades of feeling; their various changes of color 
and expression revealed the commotion of their souls. These emotions 
escaped the crowd, as was natural, for each was preoccupied with his 
own duties; they escaped Charicles also, who was busy reciting the 
traditional prayer and invocation. But I occupied myself with nothing 
else than observing these young people . . . (73)
Calasiris knows that Charicles doesn’t know that Chariclea and 
Theagenes are falling in love with each other. We may not articulate this 
to ourselves as we read the novel. But later, when Calasiris hatches a 
plot to help the young people elope together, the plot makes sense to us 
because it hinges on Calasiris’s knowing that Charicles doesn’t know that 
Chariclea loves Theagenes. 
An Ethiopian Romance is full of stratagems aimed at deceiving people 
who are not aware of the true motives of others. A stepmother wants to 
punish a stepson who rejected her amorous advances. She tells his father 
that the young man has attacked her and that, prior to this, she has long 
admonished him about his intemperate behavior, without telling his father, 
because she didn’t want her husband to think that she disliked his stepson, 
as stepmothers are assumed to do: “I knew what his behavior was, but 
would not tell you, lest I be suspected of talking like a stepmother” (10). 
Although the lecherous woman succeeds in implicating her stepson, she 
herself is later set up by her servant who wants to “procure her own safety 
by ensnaring her mistress” (15). And so it goes, subplot after subplot 
involving characters manipulating other characters into believing that 
they know others’ true intentions.
In Murasaki Shikibu’s The Tale of Genji (1008), shortly after Genji’s 
mother’s death, the Emperor sends a messenger, a gentlewoman named 
Yugei no Myobu, to the boy’s grandmother, inviting her and Genji to the 
palace. Upon receiving the grieving Emperor’s letter, the grandmother 
talks to Myobu about what it means for her to have outlived her only 
daughter: 
‘Now that I know how painful it is to live long,’ she said, ‘I am 
ashamed to imagine what that pine must think of me, and for that 
reason especially I would not dare to frequent his Majesty’s Seat. It’s 
   Lisa Zunshine  
SubStance #140, Vol. 45, no. 2, 2016SubStance #140, Vol. 45, no. 2, 2016
130 131The Commotion of Souls
very good indeed of him to favor me with these repeated invitations, 
but I am afraid that I could not possibly bring myself to go. His son, 
on the other hand, seems eager to do so, although I am not sure just 
how much he understands, and while it saddens me that he should 
feel that way, I cannot blame him. Please let his Majesty know these, 
my inmost thoughts.’ (8)
There are plenty of explicit third-level embedments in this passage, 
but for me, the most interesting one is the one that is simultaneously 
explicit and implied. While declining the Emperor’s invitation, Genji’s 
grandmother quotes from Kokin rokujo 3057, in which, as the translator, 
Royall Tyler, explains, “the poet laments feeling even older than the pine 
of Takasago, a common poetic exemplar of longevity: ‘No, I shall let no 
one know that I live on: I am ashamed to imagine what the Takasago pine 
must think of me’”(8).20  The bereaved mother knows that the Emperor 
will be pained by her refusal to visit him, and she wants him to understand 
that her feelings of depression and hopelessness make it impossible for her 
to grant his request. 
These are implied embedded mental states, but the poem that she 
evokes to convey them also contains an explicit embedment, “I am ashamed 
to imagine what that pine must think of me.” As in other works of fiction 
that integrate references to poetry with characters’ motivations, such as 
Sei Shonagon’s The Pillow Book and Cao Xueqin’s The Story of the Stone,21 
the effect is cascading. As they process these passages, some readers may 
end up constructing additional embedments, which may involve the 
intentions of the implied author who speaks to a more exclusive group 
of readers who can appreciate the nuances of classic poetry and the sen-
sibility of characters evoking it. 
2. The number of embedded mental states does not have to correspond 
to the number of characters
There is, perhaps, no better text than Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
(1719) to illustrate the claim that a single character can nest enough mental 
states to sustain a three-hundred-page novel. Crusoe spends twenty-three 
years on a desert island with nobody to talk to (Friday joins him at the tail 
end of his confinement). His loneliness does not prevent him, however, 
from engaging in introspective musings such as this one:
 From this moment I began to conclude in my mind that it was 
possible for me to be more happy in this forsaken, solitary condition 
than it was probable I should ever have been in any other particular 
state in the world; and with this thought I was going to give thanks to 
God for bringing me to this place.
 I know not what it was, but something shocked my mind at 
that thought, and I durst not speak the words. ‘How canst thou become 
such a hypocrite,’ said I, even audibly, ‘to pretend to be thankful for 
a condition which, however thou mayest endeavour to be contented 
with, thou wouldst rather pray heartily to be delivered from?’ (97)
Crusoe is shocked that he would pretend to be grateful for the condi-
tion that he would, in fact, prefer to escape. This passage is quite typical 
for Defoe’s novel, which demonstrates on every page ample narrative 
possibilities of the embedded consciousness of a solitary protagonist. 
But if a single character can be a source of mental states nested on 
the third and fourth levels, the opposite is also true. A large group of char-
acters can share a single mental state (thus forming what Palmer calls an 
“intermental unit”22), which then can be embedded the same way as the 
mental state of just one character. Here is another, typically self-reflexive 
sentiment of Crusoe, who begins by contemplating his own feelings and 
then turns to the thoughts of “all considering men”:
Upon these and many like reflections I afterwards made it a certain 
rule with me, that whenever I found those secret hints or pressings of 
mind to doing or not doing anything that presented, or going this way 
or that way, I never failed to obey the secret dictate; though I knew no 
other reason for it than such a pressure or such a hint hung upon my 
mind. I could give many examples of the success of this conduct in the 
course of my life, but more especially in the latter part of my inhabiting 
this unhappy island; besides many occasions which it is very likely I 
might have taken notice of, if I had seen with the same eyes then that I 
see with now. But it is never too late to be wise; and I cannot but advise 
all considering men, whose lives are attended with such extraordinary 
incidents as mine, or even though not so extraordinary, not to slight 
such secret intimations of Providence, let them come from what invis-
ible intelligence they will. (115).
Crusoe is thinking about the thoughts of, if not the whole of hu-
mankind, then a large part of it. He wants “all considering men” to pay 
attention to the intentions of Providence, whatever their perception of the 
source of those intentions may be. This is as large a group of people as 
they come—a massive “intermental unit”—all sharing one (embedded) 
mental state, which is embedded, in its turn, by our protagonist.
3. Although a story may seem to focus on “flesh-and-blood” characters, 
some of the mental states that we nest to make sense of what we read may 
belong to “disembodied” entities such as fate, Providence, God, and karma
Crusoe is not alone among fictional characters in pondering the 
thinking processes of the “invisible intelligence.” Other characters have 
grappled with the “secret intimations” of such “intelligences,” ranging in 
form from the karmic destiny of Cao’s The Story of the Stone to “Aubrey 
McFate” of Nabokov’s Lolita. What such nebulous entities have in common 
is their apparent capacity for intentions and attitudes, which characters 
and readers try to fathom, with varying degrees of success, all the while 
generating nested mental states. 
Here is a brief example from Edith Wharton’s short story “Xingu” 
(1916), in which a well-heeled provincial lady, Mrs. Plinth, feels keenly 
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that the heavenly power which has made her rich intended for her the 
honor of hosting distinguished visitors, an honor currently usurped by 
another, less worthy lady, Mrs. Ballinger:
An all-round sense of duty, roughly adaptable to various ends, was, 
in her opinion, all that Providence exacted of the more humbly sta-
tioned; but the power which had predestined Mrs. Plinth to keep 
footmen clearly intended her to maintain an equally specialized staff 
of responsibilities. It was the more to be regretted that Mrs. Ballinger, 
whose obligations to society were bounded by the narrow scope of two 
parlour-maids, should have been so tenacious of the right to entertain 
[the current special guest]. (25)
Having explored nested mental states in “Xingu” elsewhere,23  I offer 
here only one brief possible mapping of this passage: Mrs. Plinth resents 
that Mrs. Ballinger refuses to acknowledge the intention of Providence, 
who wanted Mrs. Plinth to host distinguished visitors. “Providence,” 
apparently, is as invested in Mrs. Plinth’s social success as the “invisible 
intelligence” of Defoe’s novel was invested in teaching Crusoe a lesson. 
We may have come a long way from Venus and Cupid: divine entities that 
guide fictional characters have, nowadays, shed their bodies. But their 
social minds are as keen and active as ever: plotting, hoping, and picking 
favorites among mortals.
4. A work of fiction may seem not to feature any thoughts and feelings
Some novels are conventionally thought not to contain any mental 
states—all the more so the embedded ones—novels whose characters are 
considered to lack “psychology,” “interiority,” “depth,” etc., or living in 
a society that eschews any discussion of emotional life. One such novel 
is Yevgeny Zamyatin’s novel We (1921). It has apparently fooled enough 
readers in several languages, because when I give talks, it is almost inevi-
tably brought up during the question-and-answer period as an example 
of a work of fiction that contains no nested mental states. Yet as I have 
demonstrated elsewhere,24  We prompts us to construct embedded mental 
states to make sense of what is going on as much as any other novel. The 
fact that we are not aware of those mental states testifies, once again, to 
the unreflective speed with which we attribute thoughts and feelings 
when we encounter behavior. 
Just as Zamyatin’s novel, Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian: Or 
the Evening Redness in the West (1985) was offered up to me as a text that 
does not nest mental states. The colleague who brought it up felt that in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, writers had to rely on nest-
ing—what with all those thick courtship novels focused on characters’ 
feelings!—but, surely, the later-day authors, such as McCarthy, bred on 
modernism and postmodernism, have outgrown such a reliance. In a mo-
ment, we will take a look at Blood Meridian, but, first, a short digression 
on suggestions.
I am always happy when other scholars come up with works of 
fiction that, they think, don’t embed thoughts and feelings. Apart from 
being grateful to them for providing me with good case studies (out of 
nine or so novels discussed in this essay, four were suggested to me in this 
fashion), I also think that theirs is an appropriate reaction to the grand 
claim that I make, which is that without mental states embedded on at 
least the third level, implied or explicit, there is no fiction. Of course, liter-
ary scholars should be skeptical and reach out for titles that might falsify 
this claim. What I find fascinating, and will merely report here without 
any comment, is the pattern underlying their examples.
There seems to be an unspoken consensus that modernist writers, 
such as Henry James, Marcel Proust, Virginia Woolf, and E. M. Forster, 
luxuriate in their nested mental states, but when you move far enough 
to the East or back enough in time, third-level nesting evaporates. A cor-
ollary to this view is that contemporary writers have outlived the need 
for embedment. To sum it up, a lot of fiction is either not sophisticated 
enough or too sophisticated to embed mental states. Writers from far re-
moved times and places are apparently not sophisticated enough, while 
contemporary writers (such as McCarthy) are too sophisticated. I will 
leave to you to decide what to make of this unspoken consensus. If while 
reading this, you have already come up with some examples of your own, 
see if they fit the pattern. 
Back to McCarthy’s novel. Blood Meridian tells the story of a name-
less teenager, “the Kid,” who joins a gang of scalp-hunters terrorizing the 
border between the United States and Mexico in 1849-1850. Here is the 
opening of the novel: 
 See the child. He is pale and thin, he wears a thin and ragged 
linen shirt. He stokes the scullery fire. Outside lie dark turned fields 
with rags of snow and darker woods beyond that harbor yet a few 
last wolves. His folks are known for hewers of wood and drawers of 
water but in truth his father has been a schoolmaster. He lies in drink, 
he quotes from poets whose names are now lost. The boy crouches by 
the fire and watches him.
 Night of your birth. Thirty-three. The Leonids they were 
called. God how the stars did fall. I looked for blackness, holes in the 
heavens. The Dipper stove.
 The mother dead these fourteen years did incubate in her own 
bosom the creature who would carry her off. The father never speaks 
her name, the child does not know it. He has a sister in the world that 
he will not see again. He watches, pale and unwashed. He can neither 
read nor write and in him broods already a taste for mindless violence. 
All history present in that visage, the child the father of the man. (3)
   Lisa Zunshine  
SubStance #140, Vol. 45, no. 2, 2016SubStance #140, Vol. 45, no. 2, 2016
134 135The Commotion of Souls
Let’s look at these three paragraphs the way a first-time reader 
would. (To approximate this experience, I only read the first two pages 
of the novel before starting to analyze its opening.) On the one hand, you 
can see why this novel may strike some as not nesting any thoughts and 
feelings. This is a far cry from, say, Proust’s Remembrance of Things Passed, 
in which a typical sentence nests explicit mental states, as in, “Sometimes 
when, after kissing me, she opened the door to go, I longed to call her 
back and say to her ‘Kiss me just once more,’ but I knew that then she 
would at once look displeased, for the concession which she made to my 
wretchedness and agitation in coming up to give me this kiss of peace 
always annoyed my father, who thought such rituals absurd . . .” (34). 
On the other hand, even though McCarthy’s “Kid” doesn’t seem to 
be able—in stark contrast to the little boy in Proust—to consider other 
people’s feelings, McCarthy’s prose achieves its uncanny effect by nesting 
mental states of the mysterious narrator and the implied author. 
There is a very peculiar narratorial consciousness at work in these 
early paragraphs. McCarthy’s narrator inserts himself in the story (“I 
looked for blackness, holes in the heaven”) and starts making the case, as 
it were, against the Kid. By being born, the Kid murdered his own mother, 
though, admittedly, she was complicit in the crime. She “did,” after all, 
“incubate in her own bosom the creature who would carry her off.” There 
is another victim, too. The mother’s death destroyed her husband, a former 
schoolteacher, a weak soul, who now “lies in drink,” quoting from poets 
“whose names are now lost.” The child “watches” his father—the word 
“watches” is repeated twice. He even “crouches” as he “watches”: a little 
predator, in whom there “broods already a taste for mindless violence.” 
The puzzling opening sentence now makes sense, too. “See the child,” 
ladies and gentlemen of the jury, see the defendant on the stand.
He has known all along how it would turn out—the narrator who 
watched the heaven on the night the Kid was born. God-like he is, but 
also accomplished, in ways that only certain sophisticated readers would 
appreciate. He wants those readers to know that, unlike other riff-raff 
populating the story, he recognizes the unintelligible sounds issuing from 
the drunk father as bits of forgotten poems. He also can cite from the poet 
whose name has not been forgotten—Wordsworth—and he does so, very 
appropriately, to support his point: “the child the father of the man.”
Thus already in the first paragraphs of his novel, McCarthy wants his 
readers to know that the story will be told by a narrator who is determined 
to aggrandize himself and to condemn the Kid. Of course, we don’t put 
it this way to ourselves, but to the extent to which we are aware of the 
strange tone of the opening, starting with “See the child,” we are nesting 
the implied author’s intentions. 
What it all adds up to is that Blood Meridian embeds mental states as 
much as Remembrance of Things Passed does, even if, in direct contrast to it, 
Blood Meridian contains almost no explicit references to mental states. We 
embed implied intentions of the narrator and the author to make sense 
of the novel’s tone—the crucial component of McCarthy’s poetic prose. 
5. Mappings aren’t pretty
Here’s something odd. I mapped the first sentence of Zadie Smith’s 
On Beauty as follows: “The author wants her readers to know that the ac-
tion will be filtered through the consciousness of a reflective narrator.” I 
can map the three first paragraphs of Blood Meridian in almost the same 
way: “The author wants his readers to know that the action will be filtered 
through the consciousness of a very peculiarly minded narrator.” What 
does it mean that the openings of novels as drastically different as Smith’s 
and McCarthy’s seem to share the same underlying structure when it 
comes to their embedded mental states? 
It means that the map is not the territory and should not be treated 
as such. Mapping nested mental states is an important critical exercise 
because it alerts us to the underlying structure of fiction and opens a 
productive conversation about similarities and differences between the 
real-life and fictional attribution of mental states. But there is nothing 
appealing about the mappings themselves. They are boring, repetitive, 
almost grotesque, and sometimes hard to follow. 
For instance, as Max Van Duijin, Ineke Sluiter, and Arie Verhagen 
have shown, by the end of Act II of Shakespeare’s Othello, “the audience 
has to understand that Iago intends that Cassio believes that Desdemona 
intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend to disturb the peace” 
(148; italics in the original). However, if this representation of embedded 
mental states relied on such sentences, it would soon become “hard or 
even impossible for a reader or hearer to make the right inferences” about 
the characters’ intentions (151).25  
Instead, in Van Duijin, Sluiter, and Verhagen’s elegant formulation, 
“narrative takes over,” that is, readers have at their disposal a number 
of “strategies characteristic of (literary) narrative discourse that support 
[their] ability to keep track of the [mental states] of characters” (149). 
These strategies supply “support and scaffolding for readers’ abilities to 
process [embedded mental states] by providing cues that prompt them to 
construct a fictional social network using mainly the same socio-cognitive 
skills as in real-life interaction” (153).26
In our analysis, we strip off this vital scaffolding. While in their 
natural environment nested mental states are often implied and distrib-
uted over the text, we spell them out and force them into sentence-like 
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propositions: “He thinks that she thinks that he wants X”; “she remembers 
that she used to think that were X to happen, she would feel Y” . . . But 
who in her right mind would enjoy reading that kind of stuff? If a work of 
fiction is a living, breathing body, then a map of embedded mental states 
is a skeleton, with all the appeal and charm of a skeleton. 
There is thus a good reason why writers themselves don’t let those 
bones stick out. “She knows that he knows that she knows” may be what’s 
going on, but they do not put it that way. If they do, then, more often than 
not, it’s a joke, a parody, or a comment on someone’s lack of interest in 
social subtleties. For instance, Forster’s Howards End contains the following 
bare-bones sentiment: “Ought Margaret to know what Helen knew the 
Basts to know?”, but the character who is spouting this crude nesting is 
Tibby, a young man, who, the narrator hastens to inform us, is bored by 
“personal relations” (254).
Here is an interesting case of the difference between the skeleton and 
the body. When the idea for a novel about a passionate love affair between 
a gorgeous older woman and a young woman struggling to make it on her 
own in New York occurred to Patricia Highsmith, she jotted in her diary 
the following description of the first meeting between the protagonists:
I see her the same instant she sees me, and instantly, I love her. Instantly, 
I am terrified, because I know she knows I am terrified and that I love 
her. Though there are seven girls between us, I know, she knows, she 
will come to me and have me wait on her. (quoted in Schenkar 270).
I know she knows I am terrified. I know she knows I love her. This is 
good enough for a map, so that the writer herself knows what’s going on 
in the scene, but it won’t do for an actual novel. Here is how this scene 
looks in Highsmith’s The Price of Salt (1952): 
Their eyes met at the same instant, Therese glancing up from a box 
she was opening, and the woman just turning her head so she looked 
directly at Therese. She was tall and fair, her long figure graceful in the 
loose fur coat that she held open with a hand on her waist. Her eyes 
were gray, colorless, yet dominant as light or fire, and caught by them, 
Therese could not look away. She heard the customer in front of her 
repeat a question, and Therese stood there, mute. The woman was look-
ing at Therese, too, with a preoccupied expression as if half her mind 
were on whatever it was she meant to buy here, and though there were a 
number of salesgirls between them, Therese felt sure the woman would 
come to her. Then Therese saw her walk slowly toward the counter, 
heard her heart stumble to catch up with the moment it had let pass, 
and felt her face grow hot as the woman came nearer and nearer. (27)
If we map out this paragraph, we may come up with several third-
level embedments. Some of them may even be similar to “I know she 
knows I love her” from Highsmith’s diary. But unlike those explicit 
embedments, the ones in The Price of Salt are implied. That is, they may 
still supply the underlying bone structure for the first encounter between 
Carol and Therese, but they are not anymore visible to the naked eye.
Meanwhile, something else happened in the process of building 
up from the bare bones of “I know she knows I love her.” Other embed-
ments came into being, those involving not just the main characters, but 
the implied author and the implied reader. For instance, does Highsmith 
want her readers to think that while Therese feels helplessly “caught” by 
the “light or fire” of Carol’s eyes, Carol, too, is powerfully compelled to 
come “nearer and nearer”? Moreover, I catch myself wondering whether, to 
someone reading in 1952, this dance of fatally attracted butterflies might 
have indicated that Highsmith wanted her audience to fear that her story 
would fall into the predictable 1950s pattern of depicting a lesbian love 
relationship as doomed. 
The gossamer thread of such thoughts reminds us again why embed-
ded mental states in fiction are emergent rather than immanent. Because 
fictional embedments are generated by style, genre, and ideology, but 
also by the history of reading and the individual perspective, the tension 
between the text and its map will never be resolved. 
Conclusion: What Is Truly Exciting?
When I talk about embedded mental states with my colleagues in 
literary studies, they sometimes wonder about my focus on the third 
level, as opposed to higher and thus more challenging and presumably 
more exciting levels. As one anonymous reader has put it, “even if one 
agrees that triply-nested mental states are pervasive in fiction, pervasive-
ness and importance are very different things. It is perhaps what fiction 
does rarely, intermittently, and unexpectedly that defines its cognitive 
potential—not what it does all the time.” This is a fair objection, so let’s 
consider it in some detail. 
First of all, one can certainly make a fruitful study of higher levels 
of embedment in fiction. I have done so myself on several occasions, 
looking at the fifth level of embedment in the prose of Virginia Woolf as 
well as at even more spectacular—perhaps sixth!—level of embedment in 
Restoration Comedy.27  The latter case is particularly interesting because 
it appears that on stage, to adapt Van Duijin, Sluiter, and Verhagen’s 
phrasing, bodies “take over.” That is, the body language of actors may 
contribute to the narrative scaffolding, facilitating viewers’ comprehen-
sion of high-level nestings. 
Second, I don’t want to be misunderstood as saying that fiction relies 
only on third-level embedments. In fact, many of my examples, here and 
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elsewhere, would be better described as functioning on the third-to-fourth 
level. What I propose instead is that the third-level embedment consti-
tutes a crucial threshold for fiction, below which fiction cannot survive. (In 
contrast, a newspaper article can do very well with just second-level em-
bedment; a chemistry textbook, with first-level embedment; a dishwasher 
manual, with no embedded mental states at all.) In this context, occasional 
fifth- and sixth-level embedments in fiction do not represent a break with 
or an exception to the third-level “rule.” On the contrary, they prove this 
rule, for each of them embeds mental states on at least the third level.
This said, I believe that fifth- and sixth-level embedments are not, 
on their own, indicative of a greater literary sophistication. The quality 
of embedment—that is, stylistic devices used to generate implied mental 
states—trumps the quantity. Even for such authors as Henry James—who, 
people assume, soars freely in the fifth-level empyrean—there is plenty to 
do on the third level. Shakespeare, Austen, Muriel Spark, and Penelope 
Fitzgerald; Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Lev Tolstoy, and Tatiana Tolstaya; 
Apuleius and Heliodorus, Cao Xueqin and Murasaki Shikibu, all ply their 
un-humble trade largely on the seemingly humble third level. If we are in 
the mood for a narrative of progress or teleology, we can say that, rather 
than finding ways to jump to a higher level, fiction is always on the lookout 
for new ways to nest mental states on the third, or third-to-fourth level. 
And, moreover, is it even true that “pervasiveness and importance 
are very different things”? It’s certainly not true in the case of many other 
cognitive endowments. For instance, our ability to see is pervasive; but 
isn’t the visual system an amazing feat of evolutionary engineering, end-
lessly important, and appearing more impressive as we keep learning 
new things about it? 
Just so, a third-level nesting is not a cognitive commonplace. We 
don’t construct it at the drop of a hat if a first-level nesting will suffice. To 
quote Apperly again, what “gets us through our social day” is a “combi-
nation of low-level mindreading processes and the rich endowment of social 
knowledge that we gain through development” (155; emphasis added). 
The triply embedded emotional dilemmas that I described in the begin-
ning of this essay rather stand out amidst the majority of my daily social 
experiences, which rely on low-level nesting, “social scripts and schemas, 
and the normative principles” (Apperly 129).
And yet we have tremendous cultural repositories of information 
requiring “pervasive” third-level embedment, which would not be as-
similated otherwise. It’s really quite incredible if you think about it. A 
work of fiction will not lodge itself into our consciousness unless we spend 
hours awash in implied and explicit third-level embedments. To me, what 
“defines” fiction’s “cognitive potential” is that, immersed in it, we can 
spend hours on end embedding mental states on the third level and enjoy 
it, and not that once in a while we also process a sixth-level embedment. 
Just because the “rare” is possible, there is no reason to take what fiction 
“does all the time” for granted. 
One can’t help wondering whether sustained exposure to the inten-
sified mindreading offered by fiction has any long-term impact on our 
social life.28  For instance, if we read a lot of novels, do we become more 
attuned to triply embedded mental states in our immediate social envi-
ronment and begin to seek situations that would allow us to experience 
them at a greater frequency? 
It seems to me that we don’t, unless you count as such an impact the 
desire to read more novels or the decision to go to a graduate program to 
study literature. To put it starkly, it’s quite possible that the main effect 
of reading fiction is that it makes one a better reader of fiction. As a side 
effect, it may improve one’s vocabulary, which has its own cascading 
benefits,29  but it does not translate into superior mindreading skills in 
daily social interactions.
Nor should it, if you think about it. While building on our evolved 
cognitive adaptations for mindreading, fiction has also run away with 
these adaptations, having amassed a repertoire of extremely nuanced 
stylistic tools for embedding mental states. We don’t just push aside those 
stylistic trimmings to get to the real meat of social mindreading. Literary 
mindreading is thus its own unique phenomenon, and recognizing the 
embedment of mental states on at least the third level as one of its key 
features is an important step toward understanding it.
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8. See Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction and Getting Inside Your Head. 
9.  How many, 180. See also Whalen et al, “Increases” and Whalen et al, “Validating.”
10. Astington et al, “Theory of mind,” 133. 
11. For a review, see Apperly, 11-34. See also Miligan et al. 
12. See Saxe, “The New Puzzle.”
13. Saxe, http://saxelab.mit.edu/resources/papers/in_press/Saxe_RTPJChapter.pdf
14. See Saxe and Powell.
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15. Skerry and Saxe, 7.
16. Saxe, “The New Puzzle,” 108.
17. See Saxe, “The New Puzzle,” 110, and Apperly 108-181.
18. See Drucker, 64-137.
19. Zunshine, “Cognitive Alternatives,” 151.
20. Compare to other translations, e.g., Seidensticker’s: “Ashamed before the Takasago 
pines,/I would not have it known that I still live” (9), or Waley’s: “Though I know that 
long life means only bitterness, I have stayed so long in the world that even before the 
Pine Tree of Takasago I should hide my head in shame” (9).
21. See Zunshine, “From the Social.”
22. Palmer, “Storyworlds.”
23. See Zunshine, “Theory of Mind.”
24. See Zunshine, “The Secret Life.”
25. Note that Van Duijin, Sluiter, and Verhagen use the term “multiple-order intentionality” 
(149) rather than “embedded mental states.” 
26. Compare to Schneider’s useful description of various sources of information involved 
in constructing a mental model of a character (“The Cognitive Theory,” 122-23).
27. See Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction and “Why Jane Austen,” 287-89.
28. See Kidd and Castano for a discussion of the possible short-term impact. 
29. See Zunshine, “The Secret Life.”
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